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NOTES AND COMMENT
Two noteworthy contentions were advanced by the able counsel for
the city in a futile attempt to maintain the position of their predecessors:
(i) that the term "jury" was loosely used at the time of the adoption
of the constitution, and (2) that the uniform interpretation given to
a constitutional provision for a number of years must be followed. The
first is sufficiently answered in the words of the court, quoted above.
As to the second, the court held that this rule applied only where there
was an ambiguity in the constitutional provision. Here the clause was
clear and unambiguous and this rule had no application.
WILL C. G0BEL
Wills: Effect of a provision that testator should be deemed, in the
event of death in common disaster of the testator and wife, to have
predeceased his wife.-In the Matter of the Will of Charles F. Fowles."
The will of the testator provided that if he and his wife should die in
a common disaster in such circumstances as to render it impossible to
determine who died first it should be 'deemed' that he predeceased his
wife and all provisions of the will were to be construed on that as-
sumption. It was further stipulated that his wife was to receive part
of the residuary estate in trust for life with the right to dispose of part
of the share by her will. They both lost their lives in a disaster at sea,
and there was no evidence showing which was the survivor. The court,
however, permitted the testator's self-enunciated presumption to pre-
vail and the provisions of the will were given effect as though it were
indisputably established that he actually did predecease his wife. Ad-
mitting that there is no legal presumption that one survived or outlived
the other2 and the party alleging survivorship must prove it by some
competent evidence,3 the court sees no objection in carrying out the
testator's instructions. Crane, J., in speaking of the above principles,
voices the opinion of the court in these words:
But this is no more than saying that the courts are limited in knowledge of
events the same as individuals; that where no one knows who died first the courts
likewise cannot determine. It is no positive rule of law; it is a lack of one; the
expression is a mere declaration of a fundamental principle of our jurisprudence,
-that the facts must be proved. The only facts that can be proved are the sinking
and the death. Our law goes no further; it indulges in no fictions or presump-
tions. Fiction' and presumptions are means to an end in the absence of proof.
The necessity for the creation of a fact by the "ipse dixit" of the court has never
been felt by us in cases like this.
By the civil law in cases of dispute about survivorship in the cases
of common disasters, persons who by reason of age or sex or state of
health were deemed best fitted in a struggle for their lives were pre-
sumed to be the survivors.4  But this is not the rule of the common
law, being objectionable because of its apparent lack of certainty.5
222 N. Y. 222; 18 N. E. 6I1.
^Jones, Evidence 3rd Ed. Sec. 64.
'Newell v. Nicholls, 75 N. Y. 78. St. Johns v. Andrews Inst. 19i N. Y. 2S4;
83 N. E. 891.
' o L. R. A. 550.: Matter of Herman i56 N. Y. 688, 171 App. Div. 26. Notes
51 L. R. A. 864: 41 Am. Dec. 522,: 1o4 Am. St. Rep. 210.
'Middeke v. Baeder, i98 Ill. 59o, 64 N. E. 1002: 92 Am. St. Rep. 284: 59 L. R.
A. 653.
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
The general rule as recognized in England and in the United States
(Louisiana and California by statute incorporated in a modified way
the Roman law with respect to presumptions of survivorship) , is that
where two or more persons perish in the same disaster and there is no
fact or circumstance to prove which survived, the question of such
survivorship is considered incapable of being correctly answered
and in such situation, the difficulty is determined as though the death
of all occurred simultaneously 7 Briefly, the party asserting survivor-
ship, being the party averring the fact, must prove it.
Where, however, there is evidence from which inferences, fair and
reasonable, may be drawn, there is no objection to a consideration of
all the facts, circumstances, and such external indicia as may illumine
the theories and probabilities sought to be advanced. Just precisely
that method was followed in Will of Abram Ehle,8 the court examining
all the minute factors in arriving at a proper solution of a vexing situ-
ation, founded upon the determination of the survivorship of persons
burned in a fire which occurred during the night.
In short, then, generally there is no presumption of survivorship,
the civil law with the doctrine of the survival of the fittest excepted,
but this rigorous restriction yields to the propriety of introducing evi-
dence tending to strengthen or clarify what was perhaps originally
alleged. As a further relaxation of the general doctrine, is the holding
of the court in the Vill of Fowles,9 that the testator may express his
wish as to the presumptions of survivorship and that such expression
of the testator will be recognized, in the absence of any evidence over-
coming it.
J. H. CASEY
Railroads: Commission not authorized to deny certificate of neces-
sity and convenience because of detriment to individuals by inter-
ference with zoning and county planning.-Several years ago, the
Milwaukee Electric Railway and Light Co., completed their new Lake-
side power plant, located several miles south of Milwaukee and destined
to supply electric light and power to Milwaukee and its suburbs. In
order to insure a steady supply of fuel to the new plant, the company
thought it necessary to build another incoming railroad line, running
from the plant to the main line of the Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul
Railroad. The proposed trackage was to be about three and a third
miles long, running in an east and west direction. The location as
proposed would take the line through the heart of Tippecanoe, an un-
incorporated village lying about a mile south of Milwaukee, with a
population estimated variously at from a thousand to thirty-five hun-
dred people. The Electric company also proposed to build at the same
time a line about seven miles long, to run in a north and south direction.
This line was intended to skirt the towns of Cudahy and South Mil-
waukee, and the settled spots between, and thus materially lessen the
* 8 Ruling Case Law ii. Par. 13.
'Jones, Evidence 3rd Ed. Par. 64.
"73 Wis. 445., 4i N. W. 627.
9 Supra.
